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Abstract 
 
Professional sports leagues that feature teams in different countries with different currencies are 
exposed to exchange rate uncertainty and risk. This is particularly evident for three professional 
sports leagues that feature teams in the United States and Canada. We construct a simple model 
of a profit-maximizing team that earns its revenue in one currency and meets its payroll 
obligations in a second currency and participates in a league-imposed revenue sharing plan. 
Team profit can increase or decrease due to movements in the exchange rate based on a simple 
condition. Revenue sharing reduces the exposure to exchange rate uncertainty and risk. Hedging 
is possible for a single team by adjusting its payroll, but not likely. Some elementary calculations 
suggest this previously unrecognized benefit of revenue sharing is substantial for baseball’s 
Toronto Blue Jays. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most professional sport leagues in North America find themselves in the position of operating 
leagues that span an international border. The National Hockey League (NHL) operates 23 teams 
in the United States (US) and 7 teams in Canada, while Major League Soccer (MLS) operates 19 
teams in the US and 3 teams in Canada. The National Basketball Association (NBA) and Major 
League Baseball (MLB) each feature only one team in Canada. One is hard-pressed to find any 
other professional sports league in the world that spans an international border.1 The member 
federations of FIFA, world football’s governing body, operate annual tournaments that feature 
the top private professional teams in each federation, most notably the Champion’s League in the 
European federation (UEFA). Although marketed as leagues, these are not leagues in the usual 
sense that teams play a regular season schedule, agree to common business practices (revenue 
sharing of local revenues, rules regarding player contracts, and so on) and compete within the 
same talent market.  
 
Teams that operate in different countries in the same league are subject to exchange rate risk 
since the bulk of their revenues are typically in local currency but their payroll costs are in 
another currency. This is the case in the four North American leagues studied here. Their 
collective bargaining agreements stipulate that all player salaries are to be paid in U.S. Dollars 
(US$). NHL teams that operate in Canada are particularly vocal about exchange rate risk. Maple 
Leaf Sports and Entertainment (MLSE), owner of the Toronto Maple Leafs (NHL), Toronto 
Raptors (NBA) and Toronto FC (MLS), calls the exchange rate “one of the toughest risk factors 
for the company”.2 The NHL maintained an exchange rate stabilization fund during the 1990’s to 
compensate Canadian teams when negotiating salaries for free agents, however it now relies on 
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teams to hedge their payroll costs in the futures market.3 The depreciation in the Canadian Dollar 
(CAD$) amounted to a CAD$32 million increase in payroll costs for the company in 2014. 
MLSE hedged a total of US$100 million in 2014, just over half of the payroll costs for its three 
teams, incurring CAD$350,000 in transactions costs.4 The remaining payroll was left exposed to 
exchange risk. The Toronto Blue Jays (MLB) suffered an increase in payroll costs of CAD$25 
million in 2014 due to the falling CAD$. The team does not comment on whether it hedges it 
payroll costs. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to construct a simple model of a professional sports team that faces 
this mismatch in currencies and show how its profit is affected by exchange rate exposure. We 
derive a simple condition that contains local revenue in domestic currency, national revenue and 
team payroll in another currency, and revenue sharing. Revenue sharing can serve the purpose of 
at least partially insulating a domestic team from exchange rate exposure. In fact, it is possible 
for a domestic team to use revenue sharing and the setting of its payroll to construct a hedge 
against exchange rate movements, but it is not likely to be practical since it would require the 
team to achieve two objectives with only one tool. We close the paper by using some basic 
financial data for Canadian teams to assess their exchange rate exposure.  
 
LOCAL REVENUES, NATIONAL REVENUES AND EXCHANGE RATE EXPOSURE 
The collective bargaining agreements of the four North American leagues that feature teams in 
Canada stipulate that all player compensation is to be paid in US$. The largest portion of revenue 
for these teams is earned in CAD$, composed primarily of gate revenue, concessions, parking 
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and local TV and media. Revenue from national TV, licensing, logos, apparel and so on is 
collected in a central fund in US$ and distributed evenly to each team in the league. The 
currency composition of team revenue is critical in determining the exchange risk exposure of 
the team: the greater the share of revenue collected in CAD$, the greater the exposure. For 
example, through 2021 each MLB team receives US$50 million in national TV revenue alone5, 
but gate revenue for the Toronto Blue Jays was estimated to be CAD$79 million (US$59 
million) excluding other local revenue for the 2015 season.6 This leaves the Blue Jays in a 
partially exposed position with respect to exchange rate risk, but not as much as it would be 
without the national revenue. The Toronto Raptors (NBA) earned an estimated CAD$54 million 
(US$48 million) in gate revenue, excluding other local revenue, for the 2014-15 season. National 
TV revenue will total approximately US$87 million per year for the Raptors through to the 2024-
25 season, so the team is well, but not fully insulated from exchange rate risk.  
 
Canadian NHL and MLS teams receive far less in national revenues and are less insulated from 
exchange rate risk. Forbes estimates that three of the top six total revenue generating NHL teams 
in 2014-15 operate in Canada: the Montreal Canadiens, Toronto Maple Leafs and Vancouver 
Canucks.7 These teams earned an estimated CAD$98 million (US$86 million), CAD$87.5 
million (US$77 million) and CAD$81 million (US$71 million) respectively in gate revenue, 
excluding other local revenue. Each team will receive approximately US$6.7 million in national 
TV revenue (NBC) until 2021-22. The NHL sold the Canadian TV rights for CAD$5.2 billion 
until the 2025-26 season, but this revenue is fully subject to exchange rate risk. Clearly Canadian 
NHL teams are very exposed to exchange rate risk, much more so than their MLB and NBA 
cousins. This mismatch in currencies leaves Canadian teams open to exchange rate risk, 
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particularly if a depreciation in the CAD$/US$ exchange rate increases the number of CAD$ 
needed to service the payroll. Many NHL teams have noted this repeatedly in the popular press8 
and have argued for more league and government intervention in the support of the Canadian 
teams.9 MLS uses a unique system to mitigate exchange rate risk that will be discussed later in 
the paper. 
 
Professional sports teams in Canada have had to weather large movements in the CAD$/US$ 
nominal exchange rate, as demonstrated in Figure 1. The exchange rate stood at $0.8866 US$ for 
each CAD$ in October 1991 and fell to $0.6249 by January 2002. This is the lowest value for the 
CAD$ in its history and was a 29.5% depreciation over a roughly 11 year period. The CAD$ 
subsequently began a long period of appreciation, topping out at $1.0348 in November 2007, an 
appreciation of 65.6%. The 2008 economic crash saw the CAD$ fall to $0.7911 by March 2009, 
but a strong economic recovery in Canada pushed the CAD$ to an all-time high of $1.0469 by 
July 2011, a 32.3% appreciation. Since that peak, the CAD$ has suffered a rapid decline in value 
to $0.7803 by March 2016, a 25.5% depreciation. The volatility of the exchange rate has 
increased significantly. The standard deviation of the annual exchange rate during the 1990-2002 
period was $0.0762 and rose to $0.0992 during the 2003-2015 period. Hence exchange rate risk 
has increased for Canadian teams making it more difficult to form expectations of the exchange 
rate. 
REVENUE SHARING 
Under the 2012-16 CBA, each MLB team contributes 34% of its net local revenue from the 
previous year, net of any postseason revenue, to a central fund.10 This revenue pool is then split 
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evenly among all 30 MLB teams. Net local revenue includes mostly gate revenue and excludes 
revenue from luxury suites and local television and radio.  
 
MLS uses a similar system to MLB in its centralized ownership structure.11 Each team 
contributes 30% of gate revenue only into a central fund. The league then pays up to $3.49 
million of each team’s payroll and uses the remainder to finance league operations. The only 
difference between MLS and MLB is that MLS teams can only use the payment received 
towards payroll, whereas MLB teams can use the payment received for any purpose they choose. 
 
The NBA first adopted revenue sharing in 2005.  NBA teams contribute 50% of net local 
revenue (gross local revenue less allowable expenses) to a central fund that is allocated to the 
smaller market teams using a formula based on television viewership.12 The NBA revenue 
sharing plan has since been reworked since it was believed that the largest market teams were not 
contributing enough to the fund. In the new plan, in markets with less than 1 million television 
viewers, the team contributes only 15% of its net local revenue and receives a full share from the 
fund (1/30th of the revenue in the fund). In markets with more than 2.5 million television 
viewers, the team does not receive any share. Teams that fall between 2.5 million and 2 million, 
receive partial shares. In addition, teams that earn more than $10 million profit before receiving a 
share, do not receive a share. 
 
The NHL uses the most complicated revenue sharing system of the four leagues and was first 
adopted in the 2012-22 CBA. Each season, the league revenue sharing pool is established to be 
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6% of total league revenue.13 The top ten revenue teams in the NHL, after deducting certain 
costs, evenly contribute 50% of the revenue sharing pool, the remainder is financed from playoff 
(35%) and other league revenues. The pool is paid out to the bottom 15 revenue teams using a 
formula based on attendance and revenue.  
 
Each of the four leagues has designed its revenue sharing system to redistributed revenue from 
large market teams to small market teams. Small market teams receive much more money than 
they contribute, while the large market teams contribute much more than what they receive, 
which in many cases is nothing. 
THE EXCHANGE RATE AND LEAGUE EQUILIBRIUM 
Revenue sharing has been an important feature of models of professional sports leagues since 
Fort and Quirk (1995). For the most part, a large amount of research has focused on the effects of 
revenue sharing on league parity with little research on team profitability. Examples include 
Kesenne (2015), Vrooman (2009) and Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) with the parity issue still 
seemingly unsettled. Easton and Rockerbie (2005) considered the effect on team profitability of 
different revenue sharing systems with different conjectures about talent supply. Kesenne (2007) 
explored the relationship between profitability and the extent of revenue sharing and determined 
that greater revenue sharing reduced profits under a simple gate sharing system. Rockerbie 
(2009) examined how different revenue sharing systems affect the league distribution of 
revenues after sharing, but did not explore profitability. 
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We augment the simple two-league model developed in Kesenne (2015) by allowing one team to 
operate in a foreign country, hereafter referred to as Team 1. For clarity, we specify that Team 1 
operates in Canada and Team 2 in the United States. Team 1 receives its local revenues, 𝑅1, in 
CAD$, but must meet its payroll obligations, 𝐵1, in US$. We define the nominal exchange rate 
as 𝑒 = 𝐶𝐴𝐷$ 𝑈𝑆$⁄ . Team 2 conducts all of its business in US$. Let 𝑎 = 𝑚𝑈𝑆 𝑚𝐶⁄  as the relative 
market size. Winning percentages are the usual logistic functions, 𝑤𝑈𝑆 =
𝑡𝑈𝑆
𝑡𝑈𝑆+𝑡𝐶
 and 𝑤𝑈𝑆 =
𝑡𝐶
𝑡𝑈𝑆+𝑡𝐶
 where 𝑡𝐶 and 𝑡𝑈𝑆 are the talent stocks of each team respectively. Talent costs are linear in 
talent stocks, 𝐶𝑈𝑆 = 𝑐𝑡𝑈𝑆 and 𝐶𝐶 = 𝑐𝑡𝐶, where c is the marginal cost in US$. The team revenue 
functions are the simplest possible to allow for an easy solution to the model: 𝑅𝑈𝑆 = 𝑎𝑤𝑈𝑆 (in 
US$) and 𝑅𝐶 = 𝑤𝐶  (in CAD$). Revenue sharing is the simple gate sharing plan, so 𝑅𝐶
∗ =
𝛼𝑅𝐶
𝑒
+
(1 − 𝛼)𝑅𝑈𝑆 and 𝑅𝑈𝑆
∗ = 𝛼𝑅𝑈𝑆 + (1 − 𝛼)
𝑅𝐶
𝑒
 where  is the share of local revenue retained by 
each team. All revenues after sharing are denominated in US$.  
 
Each team maximizes its profit after revenue sharing by choosing an optimal stock of talent. The 
necessary derivatives are given below in (1) and (2). These set the marginal revenue product 
(MRP) after sharing for each team equal to the common marginal cost (c) of talent. 
 
𝜕𝑅𝐶
∗
𝜕𝑡𝐶
=
𝛼
𝑒
[
𝑡𝑈𝑆
(𝑡𝑈𝑆+𝑡𝐶)2
] − 𝑎(1 − 𝛼) [
𝑡𝑈𝑆
(𝑡𝑈𝑆+𝑡𝐶)2
] = 𝑐      (1) 
𝜕𝑅𝑈𝑆
∗
𝜕𝑡𝑈𝑆
= 𝑎𝛼 [
𝑡𝐶
(𝑡𝑈𝑆+𝑡𝐶)2
] −
(1−𝛼)
𝑒
[
𝑡𝐶
(𝑡𝑈𝑆+𝑡𝐶)2
] = 𝑐       (2) 
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Setting the MRP’s equal and simplifying gives (the Kesenne (2015) model assumes Cournot 
talent conjectures) 
 
𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐶 = 𝑡𝑈𝑆 [
𝛼
𝑒
− 𝑎(1 − 𝛼)] = 𝑡𝐶 [𝑎𝛼 − (
1−𝛼
𝑒
)] = 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑈𝑆     (3) 
 
This can be simplified to give a necessary condition for joint profit maximization in the league 
equilibrium. 
 
𝑡𝑈𝑆
𝑡𝐶
=
𝑎𝛼−(1−𝛼) 𝑒⁄
𝛼 𝑒⁄ −𝑎(1−𝛼)
= 𝛾          (4) 
 
A necessary condition is that the denominator of (4) be positive, or 𝛼 [𝑒(1 − 𝛼)] > 𝑎⁄ , so a 
cannot be too large. Greater revenue sharing (smaller ) worsens parity since 𝜕(𝑡𝑈𝑆/𝑡𝐶) 𝜕𝛼 < 0⁄  
if 𝑎𝑒 > 1, that is, the exchange adjusted value of the relative market sizes must favor Team 2.14 
Parity is decreasing in the exchange rate since it can be shown that 𝜕(𝑡𝑈𝑆/𝑡𝐶) 𝜕𝑒 =⁄ (𝑡𝑈𝑆/
𝑡𝐶)(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼 > 0. The winning percentages are 𝑤𝑈𝑆 = 𝛾 (1 + 𝛾)⁄  and 𝑤𝐶 = 1 (1 + 𝛾)⁄ . 
Team payrolls at the equilibrium can be found by computing the area below the marginal cost 
line. 
 
𝑐𝑡𝑈𝑆 = 𝑤𝑈𝑆𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑈𝑆
∗ = [𝛾 (1 + 𝛾)⁄ ] [𝑡𝐶 [𝑎𝛼 − (
1−𝛼
𝑒
)]] = [𝛾 (1 + 𝛾)⁄ ] [𝑤𝐶 [𝑎𝛼 − (
1−𝛼
𝑒
)]] =
[𝛾 (1 + 𝛾)⁄ ][1 (1 + 𝛾)⁄ ] [𝑎𝛼 − (
1−𝛼
𝑒
)] = 𝛾 (1 + 𝛾)2 [𝑎𝛼 − (
1−𝛼
𝑒
)]⁄    (5) 
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𝑐𝑡𝐶 = 𝑤𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐶
∗ = [1 (1 + 𝛾)⁄ ] [𝑡𝑈𝑆 [
𝛼
𝑒
− 𝑎(1 − 𝛼)]] = [1 (1 + 𝛾)⁄ ] [𝑤𝑈𝑆 [
𝛼
𝑒
− 𝑎(1 − 𝛼)]] =
[1 (1 + 𝛾)⁄ ][𝛾 (1 + 𝛾)⁄ ] [
𝛼
𝑒
− 𝑎(1 − 𝛼)] = 𝛾 (1 + 𝛾)2 [
𝛼
𝑒
− 𝑎(1 − 𝛼)]⁄    (6) 
 
With 𝑎 = 1.5, 𝑒 = 1 and 𝛼 = 1, an initial league equilibrium is established at 𝑤𝑈𝑆 = 0.6, 𝑤𝐶 =
0.4, 𝑐𝑡𝑈𝑆 = 0.36, 𝑐𝑡𝐶 = 0.24, 𝜋𝑈𝑆 = 0.54 and 𝜋𝐶 = 0.16 (CAD$). Table 1 summarizes the new 
equilibrium values with a depreciation in the CAD$ to e = 1.4 and/or a revenue sharing of  = 
0.7. With the exchange rate at parity, greater revenue sharing worsens parity, reduces payrolls 
and increases profitability for both teams. For the Canadian team, lower revenue is more than 
offset by a lower payroll. These results agree with those found in Kesenne (2015). Depreciating 
the exchange rate without any revenue sharing also worsens parity and reduces the payroll for 
both teams. Profits diverge with the U.S. team experiencing higher profit and the Canadian team 
lower profit (in CAD$). In this case, the reduction in payroll is not sufficient to offset the loss in 
revenue for the Canadian team.  
 
An exchange rate depreciation hurts profitability for the Canadian team, but greater revenue 
sharing increases its profitability in the two-team league model. The last column in Table 1 
introduces revenue sharing ( = 0.7) and an exchange rate depreciation (e = 1.4). The result is an 
increase in profit. Parity moves against the Canadian team, however the Canadian team shares in 
the increased revenue for the U.S. team that results. Both teams reduce their payrolls. Revenue 
sharing has more than offset the effect of the exchange rate depreciation for the Canadian team. 
However this is not a general result. In our simple model, it only takes a small amount of revenue 
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sharing ( = 0.96) to offset the negative effects on profit of the exchange rate depreciation, but 
our simple model cannot be trusted to measure the effects using real world data. Nevertheless 
revenue sharing can at least reduce the loss in profit from exchange rate risk and that makes 
revenue sharing an effective league policy to assist Canadian teams beyond just the small market 
assistance the policy provides. We explore this effectiveness more thoroughly in the next section 
with the use of a partial equilibrium approach. 
 
PROFIT IN THE SHORT-RUN 
In this section, we build a simple model of a single team in a sports league that features a 
somewhat more complex and realistic revenue sharing system than in the previous section, and 
then determine how movements in an exchange rate affect profitability. Consider a professional 
sports league composed of N teams with J (𝐽 ≤ 𝑁) teams that operate in a second country. For 
the purpose of clarity, we will assume that the J teams operate in Canada and the remaining N-J 
teams operate in the United States. As before, we will focus our attention on one of the Canadian 
teams we will designate as Team 1. Team 1 receives its local revenues, 𝑅1, in CAD$, but must 
meet its payroll obligations, 𝐵1, in US$. All other costs the team faces are in CAD$. Each of the 
N teams receives an equal share of national revenues (television and so on) in US$. These 
national revenues are independent of the operations of any single team and are treated as 
exogenous. We now define the nominal exchange rate as 𝑒 = 𝑈𝑆$ 𝐶𝐴𝐷$⁄  since we can analyze 
profit for the Canadian team in CAD$ with our partial equilibrium approach. 
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The league uses a central pool revenue sharing system where each team contributes a share, 1 −
𝛼, of its local revenue to the pool each season and retains a share, α (0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1). We denote the 
number of shares paid to the ith team from the pool as 𝛾𝑖 with the adding-up constraint 
∑ 𝛾𝑖 = 𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1 . This term broadly captures the unequal sharing of the revenue pool found in the 
NBA, NHL and MLB. For the large market, top revenue teams, 𝛾𝑖 = 0 in the NHL, NBA and 
MLB. For the small market teams with low revenues, 𝛾𝑖 > 1. With the equal revenue sharing 
system in MLS, 𝛾𝑖 = 1 for every team. We define 𝜃𝑖 = 𝛾𝑖 𝑁⁄  as the “effective share” received 
from the revenue sharing pool in which 0 ≤ 𝜃𝑖 ≤ 1 and ∑𝜃𝑖 = 1. 
 
Profit after revenue sharing for Team 1 in CAD$ is given by (where a superscript A denotes after 
revenue sharing, a superscript C denotes CAD$ and a superscript US denotes US$) 
 
𝜋1
𝐴 = 𝛼𝑅1
𝐶 + 𝜃1(1 − 𝛼) (𝑅1
𝐶 + ∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝐶𝐽
𝑖=2 +
1
𝑒
∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝑈𝑆𝑁
𝑖=𝐽+1 ) +
𝑅𝐶𝐹
𝑈𝑆
𝑒𝑁
−
𝐵1
𝑈𝑆
𝑒
   (7) 
 
In the event that the league has a salary cap, the team’s payroll defined in US dollars is assumed 
to be a simplified version of the one used in the NFL, NBA, and NHL where the total league 
payroll is constrained to be 50 percent of anticipated league revenues divided equally among N 
teams. The team’s payroll (indeed every team) in US dollars is defined as 𝐵1
𝑈𝑆 =
𝑒 ∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝐶𝐽
𝑖=1 +∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝑈𝑆𝑁
𝑖=𝐽+1
2𝑁
.   
 
13 
 
Team 1 contributes a portion of its local revenue,(1 − 𝛼)𝑅1
𝐶, into the revenue sharing pool. The 
other J-1 Canadian teams contribute a share of their local revenues, (1 − 𝛼)∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝐶𝐽
𝑖=2  into the 
revenue sharing pool, as do the N-J US teams.15 Team 1 receives a share of the revenue sharing 
pool converted in CAD$ given by the second term in (7). Central fund revenue is denoted as 𝑅𝐶𝐹
𝑈𝑆 
with Team 1 receiving an equal share converted to CAD$. Collecting some terms, (7) can be 
rewritten as 
 
𝜋1
𝐴 = (𝛼 + 𝜃1(1 − 𝛼))𝑅1
𝐶 + 𝜃1(1 − 𝛼) (∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝐶𝐽
𝑖=2 +
1
𝑒
∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝑈𝑆𝑁
𝑖=𝐽+1 ) +
𝑅𝐶𝐹
𝑒𝑁
−
𝐵1
𝑈𝑆
𝑒
  (8) 
 
To determine how profit for the Canadian team will change given a change in the exchange rate, 
we take the derivative below.16 
 
𝜕𝜋1
𝐴
𝜕𝑒
= −
𝜃1(1−𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐿
𝑈𝑆
𝑒2
−
𝑅𝐶𝐹
𝑁
𝑒2
+
𝐵1
𝑈𝑆
𝑒2
        (9) 
 
In the event that there is a salary cap, substituting for 𝐵1
𝑈𝑆, (9) becomes: 
 
𝜕𝜋1
𝐴
𝜕𝑒
= −
𝜃1(1−𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐿
𝑈𝑆
𝑒2
−
𝑅𝐶𝐹
𝑁
𝑒2
+
𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐿
𝑈𝑆
2𝑁𝑒2
        (9’) 
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We have denoted ∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝑈𝑆𝑁
𝑖=𝐽+1  as 𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐿
𝑈𝑆  for simplicity (ROL = rest of league in the US). Since the 
exchange rate is US$ per Canadian $, a depreciation in the Canadian $ is a negative value of de. 
In 9’, when the Canadian dollar depreciates (𝑑𝑒 < 0) the first term identifies the improvement in 
marginal revenue measured in Canadian $ from the revenue sharing pool measured in US $.  The 
second term reflects the increase in revenue from the Canadian share of the central fund 
(converted from US $ to Canadian $), while the final term is the loss associated with the increase 
in Canadian $ required to meet the new US $ salary cap resulting from the depreciation.  That is 
the Canadian team gains on the revenue side and loses even though US $ salary cap falls since it 
is converted to Canadian $.  The first terms reflect Canadian $ value of the marginal value of the 
revenue fund. The last term is the Canadian $ value of the marginal change in the revenue cap. 
 Equation (10) follows from (9) (without a salary cap), and solves for a condition for Team 1 
profit to increase in CAD$ given a depreciation in the exchange rate (recognizing that 𝑑𝑒 < 0 for 
a depreciation of the Canadian dollar). Equation (10’) gives the condition with a cap. 
 
𝜃1(1 − 𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐿 +
𝑅𝐶𝐹
𝑁
> 𝐵1
𝑈𝑆         (10) 
 
𝜃1(1 − 𝛼)𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐿 +
1
𝑁
[?̅?𝑐 + 𝑅𝐶𝐹] > 𝐵1
𝑈𝑆       (10’) 
 
In (10’) ?̅?𝑐 is the average revenue of the other J-1Canadian teams. 
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To increase Team 1’s profit, the US$ value of the local revenue pool received from the rest of 
the league, added to the share of the US$ central fund revenue, must be greater than the US$ 
liability of the team payroll. Less revenue sharing (larger α) or an increase in market size 
(smaller 𝛾1, and therefore smaller 𝜃1) makes the condition less likely to hold. The result is 
indeterminate with a greater number of teams (larger N) since total local revenue for the league 
will increase as well.17  Larger central fund revenues makes the condition more likely, as does a 
smaller payroll for the Canadian team. A greater share of league revenue made up of CAD$ 
reduces 𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐿
𝑈𝑆  and makes the condition less likely. These all make sense. Revenue sharing 
partially insulates the Canadian team from adverse depreciations in the CAD$ exchange rate 
since receipts from the plan are denominated in US$. Receipts from the central fund are also in 
US$. However profit will decrease with an appreciation in CAD$ if (10) holds since the sign of 
the condition will be reversed. Team 1 is still subject to exchange risk. The appeal of the short-
run condition in (10) is that it is not difficult to operationalize as the variables and parameters 
can be measured.  
 
In the salary cap case (10’) it is clear that the likelihood of the condition being satisfied is greater 
than without a salary cap in (10). This is because of the presence of  ?̅?𝑐 in (10’). Without the 
salary cap the payroll is unaffected in the short run by the exchange rate depreciation. However, 
with a cap the payroll is reduced by a fraction of the depreciation of the exchange rate which 
helps to offset the decrease in revenue received from the revenue sharing plan and helps 
profitability. 
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Whether or not there is a salary cap, for the U.S. team’s revenue after sharing will decrease since 
the US$ value of the contributions of the Canadian teams are reduced. Essentially all U.S. teams 
will share in the loss of the US$ value of Canadian revenues. This will reduce the demand for 
talent and lower salaries for players. To explore this issue, one would need to construct best 
response functions for all teams and solve for their Nash equilibrium talent stocks. Without 
explicitly solving for the Nash equilibrium the effects on the distribution of league talent is 
nonetheless predictable.  Talent demand drops for every team and lowers the league’s stock of 
talent and reduces the wage paid per unit of talent.  The Canadian team’s talent stock will decline 
by relatively more than that experienced by US teams further reducing the Canadian team’s 
winning percentage. 
 
Hedging 
Investors can manage exchange risk on a day to day basis by constructing hedges in futures 
markets. A nominal exchange rate is just the price of one currency in terms of another and 
futures markets can be used to hedge price risk for many different types of commodities. In the 
case of a Canadian team, the management wants to seek protection against a depreciation in the 
CAD$ in the future since it must meet its payroll in US$. Since it must purchase US$ in the 
future, it buys a contract to purchase US$ and closes its position by selling a contract to sell 
CAD$ at the same time. Neither a profit nor a loss can be made on the hedge and the cost is the 
transactions costs to write the two contracts. 
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Canadian NHL teams do construct hedges in the futures market.18 However, they admit that 
hedges are hard to construct since the opening and closing positions must be the same for the 
number of contracts and the delivery month. The management of the team must know its future 
payroll with certainty to construct a perfect hedge, otherwise it will be exposed to some 
exchange rate risk. It must also know the number of years remaining in its player contracts so as 
to time the termination of the hedge positions correctly. In addition, the number of participants in 
the futures markets willing to write two to four year contracts on exchange rates is very small.19 
 
The Canadian team could effectively construct a hedge that eliminates exchange risk by setting 
its payroll in US$ just equal to the left hand side of (10). The payroll is then determined by 
largely exogenous variables that can be measured and forecast. The difficulty is that such a 
hedging strategy would not allow for profit-maximization. Professional sports league models 
typically assume that a team maximizes its profit with respect to its own stock of talent, 𝑡𝑖. The 
revenue function is 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑅𝑖(𝑤𝑖) in its most general form, with the team winning percentage 
determined by 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖(𝑡𝑖 , 𝑇). The form of the payroll function is assumed to be 𝐵1
𝑈𝑆 = 𝑐𝑡𝑖 
where c is the marginal cost of talent. The solution to the profit-maximization problem is an 
optimal team stock of talent, 𝑡𝑖
∗, which determines team revenue and payroll. It is very unlikely 
that the optimal payroll for the Canadian team, 𝐵1
𝑈𝑆∗ = 𝑐𝑡1
∗, would just satisfy the equality 
necessary in (10).  
 
PROFIT IN THE LONG-RUN 
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One can think of (10) and (10’) as short-run conditions since we have assumed that local revenue 
and payroll are not functions of the exchange rate. Over the course of a season or two, the 
Canadian team might not able to adjust its talent stock in response to changes in the exchange 
rate due to player contracts that are a fixed length longer than one season. The median contract 
length is three years in the NHL and the NBA20, and only one season in MLB. No information on 
contract lengths could be obtained for MLS. Of course, a team must also deal with constantly 
overlapping contracts that might provide more flexibility in moving talent. 
 
A team can purchase and release talent freely in the long-run. Hence, after maximizing profit, the 
Canadian team determines 𝑅1
∗ = 𝑅1
∗(𝑒) and 𝐵1
𝑈𝑆∗ = 𝐵1
𝑈𝑆∗(𝑒). The exchange rate enters as a shift 
parameter in the optimized local revenue and payroll functions and the team profit for the case 
without or with a salary cap are given by (11)21 
 
𝜋1
∗𝐴 = (𝛼 + 𝜃1(1 − 𝛼))𝑅1
𝐶∗ + 𝜃1(1 − 𝛼) [∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝐶𝐽
𝑖=2 +
1
𝑒
𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐿
𝑈𝑆 ] +
𝑅𝐶𝐹
𝑈𝑆
𝑒𝑁
−
𝐵1
𝑈𝑆∗
𝑒
   (11) 
 
The required derivative without a salary cap is given in (12).22 
 
𝜕𝜋1
∗𝐴
𝜕𝑒
= (𝛼 + 𝜃1(1 − 𝛼))
𝜕𝑅1
∗
𝜕𝑒
−
𝜃1(1−𝛼)
𝑒2
𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐿
𝑈𝑆 −
1
𝑁2𝑒2
𝑅𝐶𝐹
𝑈𝑆 −
𝑒
𝜕𝐵1
∗
𝜕𝑒
−𝐵1
𝑈𝑆∗
𝑒2
   (12) 
 
The case of a salary cap is displayed in (6’). 
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𝜕𝜋1
∗𝐴
𝜕𝑒
= (𝛼 + 𝜃1(1 − 𝛼))
𝜕𝑅1
∗
𝜕𝑒
−
𝜃1(1−𝛼)
𝑒2
𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐿
𝑈𝑆 −
1
𝑁2𝑒2
𝑅𝐶𝐹
𝑈𝑆 +
𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐿
𝑈𝑆
4𝑁2𝑒2
    (12’) 
 
There is only a single term that differs between (12) and (12’).  Taking the difference between 
(12’) and (12) gives 
 
𝜕𝜋1
∗𝐴
𝜕𝑒
]
(6)
−
𝜕𝜋1
∗𝐴
𝜕𝑒
]
(6′)
= (
𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐿
𝑈𝑆
4𝑁2𝑒2
+
𝑒
𝜕𝐵1
∗
𝜕𝑒
−𝐵1
𝑈𝑆∗
𝑒2
)       (13) 
 
Noting that 
𝑒𝜕𝐵1
𝑈𝑆∗
𝐵1
𝑈𝑆∗𝜕𝑒
≡ 𝜂𝑒
𝐵1
𝑈𝑆∗
, yields a simplified expression 
 
𝜕𝜋1
∗𝐴
𝜕𝑒
]
(6)
−
𝜕𝜋1
∗𝐴
𝜕𝑒
]
(6′)
= (
?̅?𝑅𝑂𝐿
𝑈𝑆
4𝑁
+ 𝐵1
𝑈𝑆 [𝜂𝑒
𝐵1
𝑈𝑆∗
− 1])
1
𝑒2
      (14) 
 
With a salary cap it is clear that the depreciation of the exchange rate reduces the likelihood of a 
decrease in profit since the first term is unambiguously positive. A sufficient condition to ensure 
that a depreciation of the exchange rate does not reduce profit is that 𝜂𝑒
𝐵1
𝑈𝑆∗
> 1. Without a salary 
cap, the decrease in payroll may be sufficiently large to offset the drop in revenue from the 
revenue sharing program.  Unfortunately these long run conditions are particularly difficult to 
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evaluate empirically.  Consequently, the next section explores the short run effects on 
profitability of movements in the exchange rate. 
 
SOME CALCULATIONS 
To evaluate the short-run condition in (10), we require values for the average local revenue 
shared by the N-J US teams (?̅?𝑅𝑂𝐿 =
1
𝑁
𝑅𝐶𝐹
𝑈𝑆) in US$, the payroll for one of the Canadian teams 
(our Team 1) in US$, central fund revenue received by the Canadian team in US$ (?̅?𝐶𝐹 =
1
𝑁
𝑅𝐶𝐹
𝑈𝑆), the share of local revenues that are not shared in the revenue sharing plan (), and the 
adjustment factor for the Canadian team (𝛾1). The necessary revenue data are available from 
Forbes estimates for the NHL, NBA and MLB, however revenue data for MLS could not be 
obtained. One must assume that the Forbes’ estimates are accurate. League reported revenue 
figures for MLB are available for the 1995 through 2001 seasons (Levin et al. (2000) and MLB 
(2001)), however in this period, MLB did not use the pooled revenue sharing system adopted in 
2002 that we model in this paper. Accounting statements (Deadspin leaks) for the 2008 Anaheim 
Angels, Florida (Miami) Marlins, Pittsburgh Pirates and Tampa Bay Rays (all MLB) contain 
detailed revenues, but no statements are available for Canada’s Toronto Blue Jays. Rockerbie 
(2011) found a correlation coefficient of 0.973 between the local revenue figures reported in 
Levin et al (2000) and Forbes estimates for the same seasons. The standard error of an OLS 
regression between the two was half the magnitude of similar regressions performed for actual 
and estimated payroll data (Fort (2010)) and estimated payrolls are often used without question. 
So we will use the Forbes estimates for local revenue and central fund revenue and live with the 
inevitable criticisms. For our payroll data, we use the USA Today payroll database. 
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Table 1 presents the evaluation of the condition in (10) for MLB’s Toronto Blue Jays for the 
2003 through 2012 seasons. Local revenue estimates are net of revenue sharing, however the 
total local revenue for MLB is unaffected by revenue sharing. Estimates of central fund revenues 
include national TV deals but do not include revenues from apparel, licensing, logos and so on, 
so they are an underestimate of the actual central fund revenues received by the Blue Jays. An 
estimate for monies received from the supplemental revenue sharing fund by the Blue Jays for 
2012 is also included. All revenues and payrolls are deflated by the US consumer price index. 
The share of local revenue contributed to the revenue sharing pool changed from 34% to 31% in 
the 2007 season, then increased back to 34% in the 2012 season. The US$/CAD$ nominal 
exchange rate is the average of monthly values over each season. It was multiplied by the ratio of 
the consumer price indices (2002 = 100), CPICAD/CPIUS, to calculate the real exchange rate. 
 
According to the figures in Table 1, with positive and negative differences for condition (10), the 
Blue Jays found its profit exposed to real exchange rate movements over the 2003-12 seasons. 
But how large does the difference need to be to impose a real financial burden or benefit for the 
Blue Jays? With the real exchange rate appreciating by US$ 0.0483 between 2003 and 2004, the 
Blue Jays profit is estimated to have changed by (US$ -0.923 million x [(1/0.7677) – (1/0.7194)] 
= CAD$ 0.081 million, ceteris paribus. This is an increase in profit since the CAD$ appreciated 
and the Jays found themselves with a negative difference for condition (10). The next two 
seasons, a strong appreciation in the CAD$ resulted in reductions in profit of CAD$ 0.338 
million and CAD$ 0.829 million since the difference in condition (10) was positive. Of course, 
these calculations assume the short-run only. In the long-run, the Blue Jays can adjust their 
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payroll and other business operations to adapt to the exchange rate appreciation. However in 
practical terms, the losses in profit were not large considering that revenues from all sources for 
the Blue Jays were estimated to be CAD$ 139 million, CAD$ 167 million and CAD$ 183 
million for the 2004-06 seasons. The loss or gain in profit by not satisfying condition (10) was 
much less than 1% of total revenue for any of the 2003-11 seasons.  
 
The figures in Table 1 reveal that revenue sharing does not eliminate the uncertainty from 
movements in the real exchange rate for the Toronto Blue Jays. A computed difference equal to 
zero for condition (10) would be necessary for such a hedge. Revenue sharing does provide the 
benefit of reducing the profit risk for the Blue Jays. The standard deviation of the gain or loss in 
profit is just CAD$ 0.726 million with revenue sharing, but increases to CAD$ 2.659 million 
without revenue sharing ( = 1 in condition (10)). This is, perhaps, an unexpected benefit for the 
Blue Jays from the central pool revenue sharing plan. Unfortunately the plan changed drastically 
in 2013 and the Blue Jays probably lost this valuable feature of the earlier revenue sharing plan. 
 
Canadian MLS teams find themselves with condition (10) satisfied not by choice, but instead by 
the structure of the league’s revenue sharing plan. As already noted, each team contributes 30% 
of its gate revenue into a central pool that is then used to meet each team’s payroll up to a 
maximum of US$ 3.5 million, which is also the league imposed team salary cap. Teams can 
exceed their salary cap by signing no more than two designated players that are typically high 
profile international players. However only a few teams choose to do this and none of the three 
Canadian teams currently do. In terms of condition (10), if the monies received from the revenue 
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sharing plan just equal the team budget for players, this leaves the central fund TV revenue as the 
difference. Each MLS team receives approximately US$ 4.5 million from the central fund from 
US and international television rights (the value of Canadian television rights is not known), not 
including any apparel and other licensing revenue. Like the Blue Jays, the positive difference for 
condition (10) is not large when translated to swings in team revenues as a result of exchange 
rate movements. Condition (10) might be closer to the long-run condition (14) since MLS teams 
face a league imposed payroll and thus have a limited ability to make talent choices. 
 
The same calculations for the NBA’s Toronto Raptors cannot be performed without knowing the 
size of the team’s TV audience so as to determine the share of its local revenues the team pays 
into the revenue sharing pool. Teams with small TV audiences pay only 15% of local revenue 
into the pool and receive back a full share. We do not know if the Raptors construct hedges in 
futures markets, but we could not find any evidence that they do. This suggests that the Raptors 
are not concerned with depreciations in the value of the Canadian Dollar and that condition (10) 
might be satisfied for the team.  
 
Calculations for Canada’s NHL teams are also difficult to compute. Only the top ten revenue 
teams in the NHL pay into the revenue sharing pool and they receive nothing back. For the 
Toronto Maple Leafs, Montreal Canadiens and Vancouver Canucks, the revenue sharing plan 
offers no protection from movements in the exchange rate. An executive for the Maple Leafs 
recently stated that a one cent depreciation in the Canadian Dollar increases expenses by CAD$ 
1 million.23 That figure is roughly consistent with a payroll of US$ 65 million, well within the 
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narrow range of payrolls in the NHL. The Canadian teams that contribute no revenue into the 
revenue sharing pool definitely benefit from the plan, but we cannot estimate how much since 
the pool is not split evenly among the qualifying teams. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The US$-CAD$ nominal (or real) exchange rate has demonstrated significantly volatility over 
the last two decades. NHL, NBA and MLB teams operating in Canada are exposed to exchange 
rate risk if they do not construct hedges to protect current and future CAD$ profits. This is 
because player contracts stipulate payment in US$, while at least a portion of revenues are 
received in CAD$. This results in a currency mismatch that becomes a problem when the 
exchange rate is volatile and difficult to predict. The higher revenue Canadian NHL teams do use 
the futures market to construct hedges against exchange risk, however because they require long 
maturities these hedges are expensive. One can only conclude that these costs are smaller than 
the potential losses in profit if the exchange rate moves adversely.  
 
This paper demonstrates that revenue sharing can cushion the blow to profit for Canadian teams 
if the team’s payrolls are properly positioned. This is determined by condition (10), which if 
satisfied, increases CAD$ profit for a Canadian team in the face of a depreciation in the 
Canadian Dollar (with the U.S. Dollar), but leaves the team open to lower CAD$ profit if the 
Canadian Dollar appreciates in value. A Canadian team could hedge itself against any exchange 
rate movement by adjusting its US$ payroll to make condition (10) an equality, however this 
would require abandoning the choice of a payroll to maximize profit. The need to hedge could be 
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reduced by increasing the share Canadian teams receive from the revenue sharing pool.  Of 
course, this would come at the expense of the other teams. The revenue sharing plan is 
determined in the CBA and requires equal shares in MLB and unequal shares (that are not tied to 
the exchange rate) in the NHL and NBA. It would be possible for these leagues to tie the weights 
to an exchange rate aware formula. At present, we see no evidence of this.  
 
We evaluate the condition for the Toronto Blue Jays and find that the losses to the team from 
adverse exchange rate movements is small, even when faced with large exchange rate 
fluctuations. Revenue sharing provides an effective “hedge” for the Blue Jays that negates the 
need for the team to hedge in futures markets. This would appear to be a, perhaps unexpected, 
benefit from revenue sharing to teams that operate in another country that has not been noted in 
the literature. In general, our model demonstrates that revenue sharing can provide a partial 
hedge against adverse movements in the exchange rate that create distortions in league parity that 
do not necessarily reflect fan preferences. 
 
Canada’s NHL teams are much more vocal about exchange rate risk than their MLB, NBA and 
MLS counterparts for two reasons identified in this paper. First, under the NHL revenue sharing 
plan only the top ten revenue teams contribute to the revenue sharing pool. The Montreal 
Canadiens, Toronto Maple Leafs and Vancouver Canucks appear consistently in the top ten list, 
with the occasional appearances of the Edmonton Oilers and Calgary Flames – at five of the 
seven Canadian teams in the NHL. These teams receive no payment from the revenue sharing 
pool thus there is no insulating effect from exchange rate risk for these teams. Canada’s MLB, 
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NBA and MLS are eligible to receive payments from their revenue sharing pools and can benefit 
from the hedging effect. Second, our model demonstrated that the greater the number of teams 
contributing Canadian Dollars into the revenue sharing pool, the less the insulating effect for the 
Canadian teams receiving payments from the pool.  
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http://www.theglobeandmail.com/sports/hockey/globe-on-hockey/how-much-revenue-sharing-should-the-nhl-
have/article5103058. 
 
14 This result can also be shown by the derivatives 𝜕𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑈𝑆
∗ 𝜕𝛼⁄ = (𝑤𝐶 (𝑡𝐶 + 𝑡𝑈𝑆)⁄ )(1 + 𝑎) and 𝜕𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐶
∗ 𝜕𝛼⁄ =
(𝑤𝑈𝑆 (𝑡𝐶 + 𝑡𝑈𝑆)⁄ )(1 + 𝑎). As long as 𝑤𝑈𝑆 > 𝑤𝐶, the downward shift in 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐶
∗ is greater than that for 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑈𝑆
∗  and 
parity is worsened. 
 
15 We implicitly assume that the growth rates of income in Canada and the U.S are zero which is our short-run 
model.   
16 Since the exchange rate is exogenous to the choice the team is making, our short run holds the level of talent and 
other revenue choices constant. We assume that local revenue and payroll are not functions of the exchange rate. 
The more general case is discussed below. 
 
Endnotes 
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17 If the average stays the same, there is no change, but if the best markets have been exploited first, then we might 
imagine that the average would tend to fall.  Expansion would tend to reduce the likelihood that the condition is met. 
18 Constantineau, B. (2014, May 29). It’s fight or flight with the loonie for Canadian NHL teams. Retrieved July 05, 
2016, from http://o.canada.com/sports/hockey/nhl/its-fight-or-flight-with-the-loonie-for-canadian-nhl-teams 
19 On June 8, 2016, futures contracts for delivery of Canadian Dollars showed no volume (no outstanding contracts) 
beyond June 2017, although contracts available to buy or sell were listed up to March 2021. See 
http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/fx/g10/canadian-dollar.html.  
20 http://www.sportrac.com/. Retrieved on May 18, 2016. 
 
21 We do not explicitly treat the team owner’s optimization of the expected future path of the exchange rate. 
Equation (5) reflects the expectation that results from this optimization although not a part of our notation.  
22 We are assuming away any effect of the exchange rate on local revenue for the rest of the league. In a Nash 
equilibrium, the choices of talent stocks by the US teams can change due to the change in the talent stock of the 
Canadian team. This would require solving for the best response functions for all N teams and solving them for the 
N talent choices simultaneously.  
23 Freeman, S. (2016, January 13). Falling loonie bad news for Canadian sports fans | Toronto Star. Retrieved June 
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Table 1. Equilibrium Values for Two-Team League Model 
  = 1, e = 1, a = 1.5  = 1, e = 1.4, a = 1.5  = 0.7, e = 1, a = 1.5  = 0.7, e = 1.4, a = 1.5 
𝛾 1.500 2.100 3.000 16.720 
𝑤𝑈𝑆 0.600 0.677 0.750 0.944 
𝑤𝐶  0.400 0.323 0.250 0.056 
𝑐𝑡𝑈𝑆 0.360 0.328 0.141 0.045 
𝑐𝑡𝐶 0.240 0.156 0.047 0.004 
𝜋𝑈𝑆 0.540 0.688 0.722 0.958 
𝜋𝐶  (CAD$) 0.160 0.104 0.438 0.628 
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Table 2. Evaluation of Condition (4) for Toronto Blue Jays, 2003-12 
        Condition 4 
  
Alp
ha 
(1) 
Average Revenue 
ROL (2) 
TV 
Revenue 
(3) 
Blue 
Jays 
Payroll 
(4) 
Jays Total 
Revenue 
(5) 
Jays 
Local 
Revenue 
(6) 
Real 
Exchange 
Rate (7) 
Annual 
Change 
With 
Revenue 
Sharing (8) 
Profit gain 
(with 
revenue 
sharing)  
(9) 
Annual 
Change 
Without 
Revenue 
Sharing (10) 
Profit gain 
(without 
revenue 
sharing) 
(11) 
2003 0.66 109.50 18.19 50.16 96.79 72.1 0.7194 -0.923 0.081 -31.971 2.792 
2004 0.66 119.04 17.71 47.62 101.90 75.4 0.7677 4.548 -0.338 -29.904 2.222 
2005 0.66 128.96 17.13 42.10 125.28 106.2 0.8141 13.058 -0.829 -24.963 1.584 
2006 0.66 135.64 16.60 64.16 140.10 125.8 0.8585 -7.089 0.424 -47.563 2.843 
2007 0.69 136.22 23.51 71.06 138.82 116.5 0.9049 -12.608 -0.087 -47.547 -0.328 
2008 0.69 140.38 22.64 81.72 143.72 122.6 0.8993 -22.578 -1.637 -59.075 -4.283 
2009 0.69 143.39 22.72 67.50 136.68 110.9 0.8443 -7.372 0.833 -44.779 5.062 
2010 0.69 147.68 22.36 51.32 138.60 112.2 0.9334 9.891 -0.400 -28.958 1.170 
2011 0.69 148.76 21.67 50.07 150.36 129.4 0.9700 11.004 0.184 -28.392 -0.476 
2012 0.66 157.49 21.23 59.16 159.06 138.6 0.9544 8.404  -37.924  
            
            
All US$ millions (2002 = 100)      Std Dev = 0.726  2.659 
Jays local revenue estimated using (6) = [(5) - ((1-(1))*(2)) - (3)]/(1)       
Difference with sharing computed using (8) = [(1-(1))*((2)-(3))] + (3) - (4)      
Profit gain computed using (9) = (8)*[(1/(7(t+1))-(1/(7(t))]       
Difference without sharing computed using (10) = (3) - (4)       
Profit gain computed using (11) = (10)*[(1/(7(t+1))-(1/(7(t))]       
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Figure 1. US$/CAD$ Nominal Exchange Rate: 1990-2015 
 
 
Source: Pacific Exchange Rate Service. http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/ 
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